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Traditional Sanskrit grammar is primarily a technical enterprise, which does not constitute, in 
and by itself, a system of philosophy. Grammatical discussions may, and do, from time to 
time touch upon philosophical questions, but the idea [719] of a grammarians’ philosophy 
might not have arisen were it not for Bhart®hari. This thinker of the fifth century (as seems 
now as much as certain) worked out a philosophical system which he claimed to be 
‘grammatical’, and which (or parts of which) came to be accepted by later grammarians as 
belonging to their own tradition. Moreover, this philosophy came to be included in such works 
as Såyaˆa-Mådhava’s Sarvadarßanasa∫graha (14th century). 
 In spite of Bhart®hari, most grammarians went on to write technical grammar, with at 
best the odd reference to what came to be looked upon as their philosophy. Works wholly or 
mainly dedicated to this philosophy are few, and include primarily Bhart®hari’s Våkyapad¥ya 
and the commentaries thereon, and some relatively late authors (from the 17th century 
onward), chief among them Koˆ∂a Bha††a and Någeßa Bha††a. 
 One of the main aims of the present volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian 
Philosophies (as it was of preceding volumes), is to provide summaries of primary sources. 
No need to say, by far the longest summaries are those that concern Bhart®hari and Koˆ∂a 
Bha††a. And the summary of Bhart®hari’s ideas (by Ashok Aklujkar) has, inevitably, to be 
looked upon as something like the pivot of the book. 
 “The summaries of primary sources” — the Preface elucidates — “aim at making 
available the substance of the main philosophical ideas contained in these works, so that 
philosophers who are unable to read the original Sanskrit and who find difficulty in 
understanding and finding their way about in the translations (where such exist) can get an 
idea of the positions taken and arguments offered.” This is a laudable aim, which can, 
however, only be realized where the philosophical ideas concerned are clear to those who are 
able to read the original Sanskrit and find no difficulty in understanding and finding their way 
about the translations. As far as Bhart®hari is concerned, we are still very far from such an 
understanding. Radhika Herzberger has rightly drawn attention to “the absence of an 
integrated portrait of Bhart®hari’s thought, a portrait that would convey the essential links 
between his grammatical ideas and his metaphysical ones” (Bhart®hari and the Buddhists, D. 
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 10). And there are numerous other obscure aspects and points of 
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dispute in Bhart®hari’s thought. Presenting Bhart®hari to outsiders, therefore, implies making 
them aware of the difficulties and disagreements that exist, and providing them with the 
means to turn to the existing translations, secondary literature and even primary sources. 
 Unfortunately the summary of Bhart®hari’s though does nothing of the kind. It begins 
with a “Brief analysis” of almost four pages, which contains virtually no justifications and no 
references. Its very beginning (p. 122) exemplifies its apodictic approach: “Language (våc) 
has four levels or phases: speech (vaikhar¥), mental/intellectual or potential speech 
(madhyamå), latent totality of units (paßyant¥), and pure, basic language principle (parå 
paßyant¥rËpå).” As it happens, there is disagreement among scholars regarding the [720] 
precise number of levels accepted by Bhart®hari (he may have accepted only three of them), 
but nothing in the “Brief analysis” hints at this. Nor is there any indication where in his work 
Bhart®hari presents these levels of speech. 
 It will be instructive to pursue the inspection of this first section of the “Brief analysis” 
somewhat further, for it illustrates the difficulties users of this book will encounter. Imagine 
an innocent philosopher who reads this section and believes — understandably — that this 
first section describes an important aspect of Bhart®hari’s philosophy. He wishes to know 
where Bhart®hari discusses this point. Since the “Brief analysis” does not tell him, our 
philosopher turns to the index at the end of the book. He finds here the terms vaikhar¥, 
madhyamå, and paßyant¥, but notices with surprise that there is no reference to page 122, 
which is the page from which he started. If he takes the trouble to investigate this enigma, he 
finds out that the page numbering in the index is too high by 2 for part of the book: page 122 
corresponds to p. 124 in the index. Our philosopher now looks for a page number in the index 
that corresponds to the summary of contents of the Våkyapad¥ya, pp. 126-172, i.e., 
presumably, pp. 128-174 in the index. But none of these three terms occur here, at least if the 
index is to be believed. Suppose now that our philosopher does not give up, and reads through 
the summary. He will find on p. 137: “Grammar is the highest station of the threefold speech 
(våc) of vaikhar¥, madhyamå, and paßyant¥, and it appears in a different form in each of its 
loci.” It is only in the description of the contents of the V®tti that the philosopher will find a 
mention of the fourth level. If he now recalls from the very beginning of the section on 
Bhart®hari (p. 121) that it only “seems likely that Bhart®hari also composed the commentary 
called v®tti on at least the first two chapters of the [Våkyapad¥ya]”, he may wonder just how 
central the four levels of speech are to the philosophy of Bhart®hari. If he further knew that it 
is not at all certain, even unlikely, that the V®tti was written by Bhart®hari, he might prefer to 
leave the whole section on the four levels of speech aside as not established, and in any case 
of peripheral importance. But this far he will not get, for the book he is reading does not tell 
him about these uncertainties. 
 But what will our philosopher think of the statement that “grammar is the highest 
station of the threefold speech …, and it appears in a different form in each of its loci”, which 
he has just read? Does he from these lines “get an idea of the positions taken and arguments 
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offered”? One doubts it. Yet much of the Våkyapad¥ya is difficult and requires further study 
by specialists before it will be understood. In the situation one can only hope that the 
philosopher will not feel called upon to write about Bhart®hari and thus add to the confusion 
surrounding the ideas of this author, and that he will leave it to philologists to make further 
headway first. 
 Confusion about Bhart®hari’s intentions is not confined to minor points of doctrine and 
isolated verses of the Våkyapad¥ya. Consider the central question of what there is. The “Brief 
analysis” (p. 125) has this to say about the subject: [721] “one who is out to find what really 
exists will realize that ultimately only the physical things and the language principle exist; the 
rest of the multiplicity of objects is simply a result of the interaction of these two existents. 
Qualities …, capacities …, relations …, universals …, numbers …, phases …, grouping …, 
and absence … do not have any existence of their own apart from the physical objects.” 
(emphasis mine). But in the section on “Buddhist logicians” of the same book, written by 
Shoryu Katsura, we read (p. 27): “Bhart®hari too seems to have held an idealistic view of 
reality”. And on p. 91 we find what must be the opinion of the editors of the volume: 
“Bhart®hari identifies … the ultimate being with the essence of the speech principle … The 
entire world is an appearance … of this speech principle. … It is the same speech essence that 
appears in the form of various ideas and meanings on the one hand and their symbols — 
words and sentences — on the other, and thus constitutes the phenomenal world. This speech 
essence is of the nature of consciousness.” (emphasis mine). Different interpretations of an 
essential aspect of Bhart®hari’s philosophy occur therefore in different parts of the same book. 
Which of these interpretations is to be accepted by the non-specialized reader to whom the 
book addresses itself, and who is not even warned, much less informed, about the differences 
of interpretation that exist regarding many aspects of the Våkyapad¥ya? 
 Bhart®hari’s philosophy, as will be clear from the preceding paragraph, is not only 
discussed in the summary of his work referred to above, but also in various passages of the 
“Introduction to the philosophy of the grammarians”, which covers pp. 3-97. It is not possible 
to deal with these passages in further detail here. Suffice it to say that throughout the book, 
wherever Bhart®hari’s philosophy is discussed, more often than not it is the particular 
interpretation of the author of that section that is presented. Such interpretations are not 
necessarily without interest within the context of the ongoing exploration of Bhart®hari’s 
thought (provided that justifications and references are provided, which is not always the 
case), but they are hardly the kind of more or less definite knowledge that one would like to 
present to complete outsiders. As far as Bhart®hari is concerned, the statement in the Preface 
according to which “[t]he summaries … are intended primarily for philosophers and only 
secondarily for indologists” seems therefore particularly inappropriate. 
 Before leaving Bhart®hari, one further observation must be made. The Våkyapad¥ya 
has been edited a number of times, and several of these editions call themselves critical, yet 
only one of them is critical in the true sense of the term: this is the edition by Wilhelm Rau. It 
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is true that Rau based his edition only on mss of the kårikås, not on mss containing also one or 
more commentaries. Yet only in the case of Rau’s edition is it possible to choose a reading, 
not on the basis of personal inclination or ad hoc reasoning, but with an awareness of the 
relative importance of various mss-readings. It is true that further studies could, and should, 
be carried out in order to ascertain the position of the archetype and hyparchetypes of Rau’s 
mss with regard to the texts used by the commentators. [722] But as long as no such studies 
have been carried out, Rau’s edition is the best we have and it should be used as a matter of 
course. Most regrettably, most recent studies of Bhart®hari ignore Rau’s edition completely. 
Sometimes this leads to misinterpretations that could have been avoided (see, e.g., Études 
Asiatiques / Asiatische Studien 45, 1991, p. 9-11). In all cases it shows a lack of appreciation 
of what textual scholarship is all about. Unfortunately the book under review is no exception. 
References are made to Iyer’s non-critical editions (which, for no clear reason, call themselves 
critical), without any explanation as to why Rau’s edition is not used. 
 Later grammatical philosophers lend themselves more easily that Bhart®hari to a 
presentation in the Encyclopedia, the main reason being that their works, though perhaps 
sometimes difficult, present no insurmountable problems of interpretation. One notices with 
appreciation the elaborate summary of Koˆ∂a Bha††a’s VaiyåkaraˆabhË∑aˆa by S. D. Joshi 
(pp. 255-308). Någeßa Bha††a has been given a less generous treatment: his MañjË∑å and 
LaghumañjË∑å have not been summarized; only summaries of the ParamalaghumañjË∑å and 
the Spho†avåda, as well as of some relevant portions of the Mahåbhå∑yaprad¥poddyota, have 
been included. 
 Bhart®hari’s predecessors are dealt with, sketchily, in the ‘Historical Résumé’ (pp. 3-
32), and in the summaries dedicated to Vedic literature, Yåska’s Nirukta, Påˆini’s A∑†ådhyåy¥, 
and Patañjali’s Mahåbhå∑ya. No mention is anywhere made of the Sarvåstivådins. Yet these 
Buddhists accepted the three dharmas called nåmakåya, padakåya and vyañjanakåya, entities 
which are very similar to, if not identical with, the different kinds of spho†a that are so 
important in the grammarians’ philosophy. These dharmas might very well be the historical 
precursors and sources of inspiration of the spho†a. Some words about them would have been 
appropriate. 
 The body of the book is divided into two parts. Part One is called “Introduction to the 
philosophy of the grammarians” (pp. 3-97) and deals not only with grammarians; it pays also 
some attention to other thinkers about language, such as the M¥måµsakas, the Naiyåyikas, the 
Buddhist Logicians, and the authors of Literary Criticism. Part Two, which calls itself 
“Survey of the literature of grammarian philosophy” (pp. 101-431), confines itself primarily to 
grammarian writers on philosophy. 
 A checklist of authors and works on Vyåkaraˆa philosophy is provided on p. 22 f. of 
the Historical Résumé in Part One. Here we find, of course, Patañjali and Bhart®hari, and all 
those who defended the grammarians’ position on the spho†a in original works or 
commentaries. We find here besides the authors of commentaries on Bhart®hari’s 
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Våkyapad¥ya, also authors of commentaries on Patañjali’s Mahåbhå∑ya. This last 
circumstance explains the length of the list, which contains no less than 63 authors. Most of 
these have been given a section in Part Two, of which there are altogether 85. 
 The number of original and significant authors in the field of grammarian [723] 
philosophy is however far smaller than 63 or 85. This fact must be held partly responsible for 
a feature that will strike anyone who leafs through the book: the large number of empty or 
nearly empty pages. The explanation is as follows: Each author gets a section, each section 
start on the right hand page, and sections about authors who have written nothing of interest 
about philosophy (or whose works have not yet been studied, or even edited) range between 
short and very short. The result is more than seventy (!) completely empty pages in Part Two, 
and about as many that are more than half empty. This is not only regrettable for ecological 
reasons. The empty pages, as well as the pages that begin a new section, carry no page 
numbering. Long stretches of the book under review are therefore without a single page 
number. Yet the index at the end refers to these. The practical use of the book is in this way 
seriously impeded. 
 Pp. 433-548 contain a “Bibliography on grammar (vyåkaraˆa)”, compiled by Karl H. 
Potter. Unlike the main parts of the book, this bibliography deals with grammarians in 
general, not only with philosophers among them. Surprisingly, this bibliography contains no 
entries more recent than 1983. Even more surprisingly, the information it contains has not 
been systematically used by the authors of Part Two. This is strikingly illustrated in section 11 
of Part Two (p. 199). The whole of this section reads: “PRAMEYASA»GRAHA. The 
unknown author of a lost commentary on the Våkyapad¥ya called Prameyasaµgraha must 
have lived about A.D. 1000.” No notes, no references. The bibliography (G900, p. 475) is 
better informed: “Prameyasaµgraha on book 2 of Bhart®hari’s Våkyapad¥ya … Edited by 
Wilhelm Rau. Munich, 1981.” But not even the bibliography is aware of the review of Rau’s 
edition in Kratylos 27, 1982 [1983], pp. 78-81, which shows that the Prameyasaµgraha is not 
a commentary but an independent work, and that it is almost certainly younger than the 
commentator Puˆyaråja. 
 Unfortunately this is not the only lacuna in the bibliography, even where publications 
from before 1983 are concerned. Major works such as Pierre Filliozat’s translations into 
French of the Mahåbhå∑ya (first volume published in 1975) and Kielhorns’ English translation 
of the Paribhå∑endußekhara are missing. The only critical edition of Bhart®hari’s 
Våkyapad¥ya, by W. Rau, which is arguably the single most important work to be mentioned 
in this bibliography, is described incorrectly as “with word index” (p. 469); the book contains 
a påda-index. (A word-index has been published separately by W. Rau in 1989.) 
 The bibliography, in spite of these and other shortcomings, will be gratefully used by 
all those who are interested in the Indian grammatical tradition. Yet its lack of connection 
with the other parts of the book in which it is published will be experienced as disturbing. Part 
Two, to give another example, dedicates one of its sections to Yåska’s Nirukta, the 
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bibliography, as against this, announces that “… sciences, such as nirukta, are not covered” 
(p. 433). Påˆini’s date is “350 B.C.?” according to the bibliography (p. 441), about the fifth 
century B.C. [724] according to pages 4 and 111. (The former of these two dates appears to be 
correct; see O. v. Hinüber, Der Beginn der Schrift und frühe Schriftlichkeit in Indien, Stuttgart 
1989, p. 34.) Durgåsiµha (sic), who wrote a commentary on the Kåtantra grammar, lived 
“around or before A.D. 800” according to p. 17, around “950?” according to the bibliography 
(p. 475). (This time it is the compiler of the bibliography who appears to have made a slip; he 
refers to Belvalkar (Systems of Sanskrit Grammar) p. 73, which however states: “As 
Durgasiµha is quoted by Hemachandra, and as he knew the Chåndra Dhåtupå†ha, on the basis 
of which he put together another Dhåtupå†ha for the Kåtantra, Durgasiµha probably is to be 
assigned to the eighth century.”) The bibliography assigns the date 1540 to Íe∑a K®∑ˆa, author 
of the Spho†atattvanirËpaˆa; p. 22 repeats this date. But section 19, which is dedicated to this 
author, presents an argument to push back the time in which he must have flourished to 1510 
(p. 215). The date assigned to Íe∑a Nåråyaˆa Bha††a in the bibliography is 1546, with a 
reference to Yudhi∑†hira M¥måµsaka’s Saµsk®ta Vyåkaraˆa-Íåstra kå Itihåsa vol. 1 p. 405 f., 
which contains no such date. The section dedicated to the same author observes, on the other 
hand, that “this writer must have flourished about 1540 (though Yudhisthira Mimamsaka 
gives a date half a century earlier)”, without offering any justification. P. 22 mentions as main 
philosophical work of Bha††oji D¥k∑ita the Vaiyåkaraˆasiddhåntakårikå. This work, also 
known by the names Vaiyåkaraˆamatonmajjana and VaiyåkaraˆabhË∑aˆakårikå, is the basic 
text on which Koˆ∂a Bha††a’s famous VaiyåkaraˆabhË∑aˆa is a commentary. Yet the section 
dedicated to Bha††oji D¥k∑ita (no. 30, p. 241-42) makes no mention of this work, and provides 
only a summary of the philosophical ideas in the Íabdakaustubha. The bibliography mentions 
both works. 
 A ‘Cumulative index’ covers the last pages (563-609). While using this index it is to 
be kept in mind that the page numbering used here does not always correspond with the actual 
page numbering of Part One (see above). 
 A serious shortcoming of the main portions of the book is the frequent lack of 
references. This was pointed out above in connection with the sections on Bhart®hari, on the 
Prameyasaµgraha and on Íe∑a Nåråyaˆa Bha††a, but these are not the only examples in Part 
Two. The same shortcoming is present in Part One. The section on Literary Criticism (pp. 28-
32), for example, contains one reference to John Ruskin, Sesame and Lilies unto This Last 
(London, 1952), and one to Ùg Veda 10,71.2c; that’s all. The discussion it contains of the 
ideas of Ónandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Bha††anåyaka and Jagannåtha Paˆ∂itaråja, never 
refers to passages in their works, nor to any secondary literature. P. 52 states that “Bhart®hari 
in his Mahåbhå∑ya†¥kå accepts three pramåˆas: perception …, inference …, and scripture” but 
refers to no precise passage. P. 58 refers to some paradoxes discussed in the Våkyapad¥ya, but 
does not tell us where to find them. These and many other instances seriously reduce the value 
of the volume. 
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 Sometimes the information provided is misleading at best. P. 44, for example, states: 
“Before Bhart®hari, Patañjali in his Mahåbhå∑ya included in the aims of [725] grammatical 
study (vyåkaraˆa) the attainment of heaven (svarga) through the correct use of words and 
liberation from bondage (mok∑a).” This is misleading, for Patañjali’s Mahåbhå∑ya does not 
even contain the word mok∑a. A note refers to K. A. Subramania Iyer’s article “Bhart®hari on 
vyåkaraˆa as a means of attaining mok∑a” (ALB 28, 1964, 112-131) pp. 112-113. But these 
pages do not contain the words liberation and mok∑a either (except of course in the title). In 
fact, Iyer concludes his first section with the words: “Thus, according to Bhart®hari, the author 
of the Mahåbhå∑ya looked upon both abhyudaya and ni˙ßreyasa as two of the aims of the 
study of grammar” (my emphasis). Be it noted that not even ni˙ßreyasa is offered by Patañjali 
as an aim of grammar. One regrets once again that a work meant for non-Indologists (i.e., for 
those who cannot, or are not likely to check what is presented to them) is so sloppy in the 
information it provides. 
 To conclude, the volume on The Philosophy of the Grammarians is as a whole rather 
disappointing. Let us hope, however, that it will inspire others to improve upon it, and 
especially that it will induce them to participate in the exploration of Bhart®hari’s philosophy, 
and of the role of language in Indian thought in general. 
